Fighting to the End Read online

  Fighting to the End

  Fighting to the End

  The Pakistan Army’s Way of War

  C. CHRISTINE FAIR

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  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Fair, C. Christine, author.

  Fighting to the end : the Pakistan Army’s way of war / C. Christine Fair.

  pages; cm

  Includes bibliographical references.

  ISBN 978–0–19–989270–9 (hardback : alkaline paper) 1. Pakistan. Army

  2. Pakistan—Military policy. 3. National security—Pakistan.

  4. Pakistan—Foreign relations. 5. Islam and state—Pakistan. I. Title.

  UA853.P18F35 2014

  355’.03355491—dc23

  2013036644

  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

  Printed in the United States of America

  on acid-free paper

  For Jeff

  CONTENTS

  Acknowledgments

  CHAPTER 1. Introduction to the Pakistan Army’s Way of War

  THE ARGUMENT: EXPLAINING PAKISTAN’S PERSISTENT REVISIONISM IN THE FACE OF REPEATED DEFEATS

  ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME

  CHAPTER 2. Can Strategic Culture Explain the Pakistan Army’s Persistent Revisionism?

  PAKISTAN’S ENDURING AND EXPANDING REVISIONISM

  EXPLAINING PERSISTENT REVISIONISM

  STRATEGIC CULTURE WARS

  PAKISTAN: AN ARMY WITH A COUNTRY

  REPRODUCING CULTURE: RECRUITMENT IN THE PAKISTAN ARMY

  METHODS AND SOURCES OF THIS STUDY

  CHAPTER 3. Born an Insecure State

  CRACKING THE RAJ

  IMAGINING PAKISTAN

  THE PROBLEM OF THE PRINCELY STATES

  UNTANGLING THE PUNJAB

  BREAKING UP THE INDIAN ARMY

  HISTORICAL LEGACIES: A PUNJABI ARMY

  BUILDING A MODERN ARMY

  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PAKISTAN ARMY’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

  CHAPTER 4. The Army’s Defense of Pakistan’s “Ideological Frontiers”

  THE IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN

  THE ARMY’S EMBRACE OF THE IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN

  THE ARMY’S METHODS OF ISLAMIZATION

  THE ARMY’S INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ISLAM

  Unifying a Diverse Country across Ethnicity and Creed

  Readying the People for Army Dominance and War

  Motivating the Army for War

  IMPLICATIONS

  CHAPTER 5. Pakistan’s Quest for Strategic Depth

  BRITISH MANAGEMENT OF THE FRONTIER: THE GREAT GAME

  PAKISTAN’S ARMY SEEKS STRATEGIC DEPTH: MANAGING PAKISTAN’S FRONTIER AND BEYOND

  THE ARMY MANAGES THE AFGHAN THREAT

  The Rise and Fall of the Taliban

  THE ARMY’S AND THE INTERNAL THREAT ON THE “FRONTIER”

  IMPLICATIONS: IS THE PAST PROLOGUE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND THE FRONTIER?

  CHAPTER 6. India under the Pakistan Army’s Gaze

  MULTIPLE CRISES AND FOUR WARS

  The 1947–1948 Indo-Pakistan War Over Kashmir

  The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War Over Kashmir

  The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the Emergence of Bangladesh from East Pakistan

  The 1999 Kargil War

  INDIA: THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY

  India as a Hegemon that Pakistan’s Army must Resist

  The Perfidious Indian

  India: A Paper Tiger

  India: The External and Internal Threats Converge

  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

  CHAPTER 7. Seeking Security through Alliances

  PURSUING THE AMERICANS: AN ALLIANCE FOR SURVIVAL

  The Pakistan Tilt

  CHASING CHINA: THE ALL-WEATHER FRIEND

  THE STRAINS OF WAR

  PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA THROUGH THE EYES OF THE ARMY

  Narrating American Duplicity

  Making Excuses for China

  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

  CHAPTER 8. Seeking Security under a Nuclear Umbrella

  ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

  PROLIFERATION UNDER THE EYE OF THE STATE

  NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND USE

  RISK-TAKING UNDER AN EXPANDING NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

  AS BAD AS IT GETS?

  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

  CHAPTER 9. Jihad under the Nuclear Umbrella

  ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN’S USE OF NONSTATE ACTORS

  FROM PEOPLE’S WAR TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT UNDER A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

  PAKISTAN’S MILITANT ASSETS

  PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE MILITANTS?

  THE INTERNAL JIHAD: A CASE STUDY OF LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

  CHAPTER 10. Is the Past Prologue?

  ENDOGENOUS GAME CHANGERS

  Democratic Transition?

  Civil and Uncivil Society: Impetus for Change?

  Economic Shocks: For Better and for Worse

  Change from Within the Army?

  Exogenous Sources of Change?

  CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT?

  CHAPTER 11. The Army’s Strategic Culture and Implications for International Security

  LIVING WITH PAKISTAN’S PERSISTENT REVISIONISM?

  Appendix

  Notes

  References

  Index

  LIST OF TABLES

  3.1

  Corps and Locations

  8.1

  Cross-Tabulations of Conflict Months by Nuclear Status

  8.2

  Conflict Rate by Nuclear Period

  10.1

  Survey Items Analyzed

  10.2

  Punjabis in the Punjab versus Elsewhere

  10.3

  Punjabis versus Non-Punjabis in Punjab

  10.4

  Punjabis versus Sindhis in Sindh

  10.5

  Punjabis versus Baloch in Balochistan

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  This project has been many years in the making. There are numerous persons and institutions to thank. I have had the privilege and honor of being mentored by the finest minds in the study of South Asia’s security. Many of these persons I have now known for nearly two decad
es, and most are among my dearest friends, colleagues, and collaborators. These ustads have offered generous insights into this effort and have been a constant source of guidance in this and almost every other project I have undertaken. I owe the deepest gratitude to (in alphabetical order) Ahsan Butt, Christopher Clary, Stephen P. Cohen, Sumit Ganguly, John (aka “Jack”) Gill, Tim Hoyt, K. Alan Kronstadt, Peter Lavoy, Doug Makeig, Polly Nayak, David O. Smith, Ashley Tellis, Marvin Weinbaum, and Rob Williams.

  I owe a particular recognition to a series of US Army South Asia Foreign Area Officers with whom I have met over the years. These include Brian Hedrick, Richard Girven, Gregory Ryckman, Scott Taylor, Scott Zurschmit, and Rick White as well as Gill and Smith.

  In addition, Ayesha Jalal, Paula Newberg, and Shuja Nawaz provided thoughtful feedback early in this project. Thomas Johnson and Thomas Barfield critically read the fifth chapter of this volume with particular care. In addition, I’d like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who provided helpful critiques on the first draft.

  Many Georgetown colleagues read parts of this manuscript and gave me insightful guidance and advice from the proposal to the drafting stages. Many thanks go to Daniel Byman, David Edelstein, Bruce Hoffman, and Kathleen McNamara in particular.

  I am also indebted to the many Pakistanis in and out of uniform with whom I have had the benefit of interacting over many years, including Mahmud Ali Durrani, Husain Haqqani, Farahnaz Ispahani, Jahangir Karamat, Maleeha Lodhi, Sherry Rehman, Commodore Zaffar Iqbal, and Ehsan ul Haq as well as numerous defense attachés like Brigadier Butt and many more men in uniform than can be possibly named here for space and prudence. In past years, personnel from Pakistan’s Interservices Public Relations facilitated travel and meeting requests and answered questions. Khalid H., ostensibly from the Ministry of Information, was especially helpful as he accompanied me during travels to South and North Waziristan, Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, interior Sindh, and other locales. He also personally delivered several Pakistan Army Green Books in a paper bag to me while I recuperated from a concussion at an Islamabad “nail saloon.”

  I am also beholden to Georgetown University’s Graduate School as well as the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, which provided various kinds of support that enabled this project, ranging from small research grants to a junior faculty research leave in fall 2012. In addition, the American Institute of Pakistan Studies enabled me to do research in Islamabad at the end of 2012, and the American Institute of Afghan Studies permitted fieldwork in Helmand and Kabul in August 2010.

  Much of the data collection was done at the fine South Asia collections at the University of Chicago and the University of California, Berkeley as well as the New York Public Library. Without those resources, this project would not be possible. I am also appreciative of the brief access that I have had to the National Defence University Library in Islamabad as well as the library at the Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad.

  I have also profited from the contributions of several fabulous research assistants. Much of the quantitative work that I have done with the Pakistan Army data would not be possible without Anirban Gosh. Michael Hardin provided survey and other data analytical support. Son Lee and Cheng He presented valuable assistance with mapping programs. Finally, Sarah Watson Jordan has been my right-hand woman for two years now. It has been an honor to work with her, and I wish her the best as she leaves Georgetown and moves forward to what will be a highly productive career.

  Jacob N. Shapiro and Neil Malhotra have been my collaborators for several years. We fielded two large surveys of Pakistanis in 2009 and 2012. I incorporate some of these findings in this volume. It has truly been a pleasure to work with them as they are genuinely ingenious yet profoundly wonderful human beings.

  I thank my husband (Jeff) and family (Joe, Whitney, Mallory, Logan, Pork, Ashley, Pickles and Cam, Bob and Bug), who endured holidays and weekends without me. My dear friends Hannah Bloch, Lisa Curtis, Simbal Khan, and Praveen Swami have provided endless support as well as advice. My students have been fun sources of enthusiastic encouragement. Of course, my canine associates—Ms. Oppenheimer, Vega Pussoise, and Emma—helped ensure that I did not become obese during this process by insisting upon lengthy walks and bouts of vigorous belly rubs and “derriere scratches.” Ms. Oppenheimer has been my constant companion since 1999. Although I know I must, I cannot imagine undertaking a project without her support and pit bull spirit of surmounting.

  Finally, I thank David McBride at Oxford University Press for supporting this project. Without him, all of this would be pointless.

  Despite the collective help and wisdom of all of these generous folks, I alone am responsible for errors of fact or interpretation or a failure to be creative and thoughtful.

  CHAPTER 1

  Introduction to the Pakistan Army’s Way of War

  Pakistan was born an insecure state in 1947, and it remains so to date. To the east, Pakistan continues to reject the Line of Control cutting through Kashmir as its international border with India. Pakistan views its eastern neighbor, India, as an eternal foe that not only seeks to dominate Pakistan but also to destroy it if and when the opportunity arises. In its quest to manage its external security perceptions, Pakistan has pursued guerilla warfare, proxy warfare, terrorism, low-intensity conflict, and full-scale wars with India. To coerce India to make some concession to Pakistan on the disposition of Kashmir, Pakistan has supported an array of Islamist militant proxies that operate in Kashmir and throughout India (Ganguly 2001). Despite Pakistan’s varied exertions to wrest Kashmir through force or coercion, India has not budged. In fact, its position has hardened. India long ago abandoned the proposition that the people of Kashmir should ratify their inclusion within India through an internationally monitored plebiscite. The official policy of the Indian government now is that there will be no more changes to India’s international borders.

  Even though Pakistan has failed to make even modest progress toward attaining Kashmir, Pakistan’s revisionist goals toward India have actually increased rather than retracted in scope.1 Since the early 1970s, Pakistan has sought to resist, or possibly outright retard, India’s inevitable if uneven ascendance both in the region and beyond. Despite the fact that India decisively defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, with half of Pakistan’s territory and population lost when East Pakistan became Bangladesh, Pakistan continues to view itself as India’s peer competitor and demands that it be treated as such by the United States and others. In fact, former president and army chief Pervez Musharraf boldly declared that India must accept Pakistan as an equal as a precondition for peace (Daily Times 2006). Pakistan’s conflict with India cannot be reduced simply to resolving the Kashmir dispute. Its problems with India are much more capacious than the territorial conflict over Kashmir.

  Pakistan’s conflicts with its western neighbor, Afghanistan, also began at independence. Afghanistan sought to use British decolonization as an opportunity both to denounce the Durand Line as the boundary dividing Afghan and Pakistani territories and to make irredentist claims on large swaths of Pakistani lands abutting Afghanistan. In addition to these territorial disputes with Afghanistan, Pakistan fears that India—working alone or with the Afghans—can destabilize Pakistan’s obstreperous western border areas. This has driven Pakistan at various times to restrict India’s political and physical presence in Afghanistan. To manipulate Afghanistan’s domestic affairs and to create a regime that will forge foreign policies favorable to Pakistan and limit India’s actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan has employed Islamist proxies there since 1960, if not earlier (Fair 2011b; Haqqani 2005; Hussain 2005; Jamal 2009; Swami 2007).

  Policymakers, diplomats, and analysts puzzle over Pakistan’s ostensibly inexplicable behaviors. Why does Pakistan continue to challenge the status quo in Kashmir? Why does it support a fleet of jihadi groups despite the fact that some of these groups have turned against their patrons? Why does Pakistan persist in repudiating India’s ascendance as the prin
ciple power in South Asia and insist upon being treated as India’s equal? After all, Pakistan is a weak state with enervated governmental institutions. It is chronically unable to assert its writ throughout much of the restive and insurgency-prone areas of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the tribal areas. Ethnic and sectarian violence is a recurring menace in Pakistan’s rural and urban areas alike. In the last decade, terrorists operating under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, or Pakistan Taliban) have sustained a campaign against military, intelligence, police, bureaucratic, and political institutions and personalities as well as Pakistan’s citizens. Adding to this litany, Pakistan is noted for enduring praetorianism and anemic democratic institutions, abysmal human development indicators, and chronic shortages of power, water, and gas.

  Not only do Pakistan’s internal resources seem inadequate for the endless quest of seizing Kashmir, resisting India’s rise, and orchestrating Afghan affairs, but Pakistan also has few allies and none that support its maximalist agenda with respect to India (Kux 2001; Pande 2011). Pakistan seems to be on an interminable downward spiral. However, India has launched itself on a path of steady economic growth despite its own numerous internal security challenges, not all of which can be blamed on its western neighbor (Sahni 2012). In recent years India has enjoyed sustained economic growth, even during the global recession, which has enabled it to enact steady defense modernization while still keeping defense spending under 3 percent of its gross national product.2 As India’s domestic sources of national power have expanded, India has cultivated strategic partnerships with the United States, the European Union, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, among numerous others, and it has maintained its historically robust ties with Russia. The country has been able to generate substantial support for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (Ganguly 2012; Pant 2009a, 2009b).

  The instruments that Pakistan has developed to pursue its anti–status quo goals have incurred the wrath of the international community and, more deleterious for Pakistan, have imperiled the very viability of the state itself. Pakistan’s conflict acceptance, coupled with and enabled by its rapidly expanding nuclear program and history of nuclear proliferation, conjure fears of a nuclear conflict in South Asia between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Because Pakistan relies upon a menagerie of Islamist militant groups—for example, Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (also known as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Filah-i-Insaniat Foundation), and Jaish-e-Mohammad—as instruments of foreign policy toward India and Afghanistan, the United States has periodically considered declaring Pakistan to be a state sponsor of terrorism. Since Pakistan is perpetually dependent on various financial bailouts provided under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund as well as bilateral aid programs, such brinksmanship is breathtakingly risk acceptant. Furthermore, Pakistan has paid—and will continue to pay—a heavy price for its revisionist agenda. Pakistan’s army, which dominates foreign and defense policy, has commandeered control of the state and its resources to sustain this competition with India (Jaffrelot 2002b; Pardesi and Ganguly 2010).